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PARKER "/J, \Vo;>tACK

her
Bnt in accordance with the
rules of law the order may not be disturbed.
The order is affirnwd.
Gibson, C . .J., Edmonds, ,J., Carter,
.L, and Spenee, ,J., eoneurred.
laid

ion for a rdt(·aring

A. :\o. :21H.f:.l.

In Bauk.

1fay H, 1\J.il.]

lAlltE'l"l'1\ MAY P AHKKR, Hespondent,
WOMACK et aL, Appellants.

HOY A

[1] Negligence-Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident.-The term8
inevitable or unavoidable accident signify an injury caused
by something other than the actionable negligence of the
partie~, and iudude o11e caused by vis major, oe by an ab~ence
of exceptional foresight, skill or care which the law does not
expect of the ordinarily prudent man.
[2] !d.-Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident.-N o redress is afforded for an injury caused by an inevitable or unavoidable
accident, and the loss must be borne by the one upon whom
it falls.
[3] !d.-Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident.-The so-called defense of inevitable accident is nothing more than a denial by
defendant of negligence or a contention that his negligence,
if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury.
[4] Id.-Pleading.-The so-called dPfeuse of inevitable accident
need not be specially pleaded hut is raised by a general
denial of negligence.
[5] !d.-Defenses-Unavoidable Accident.-The so-called defense
of unavoidable accident is not limited to cases which include
affirmative evidence that the aecident was proximately caused
by circumstances beyond the control of an ordinarily prudent
perwn, since the dominant consideration in dealing with
unavoidable accident is the requirement that plaintiff make
out his case by preponderance of all evid<mce regardless of
when or by whom it was introduced, and if an accident 1:s

[2] See 19 Cal.Jur. 545; 38 Am.Jur. 648.
McK. Dig. References: [ 1-3] ~ egligence, § 1; [ 4] Negligence,
§ 113; [5] Negligenee, § 5; [6, 9] Automobiles,§ 307(17); [7] Negligt>nce, ~190; [8] Automobiles, ~385-1; (10,11] New Trial, §124.
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been inevitable or unavoidable that is equivalent
that defendant was not negligent or that his
did not cause the accident, nnd plaintiff has thereby
failed in his proof.
Automobiles-Instructions-Unavoidable Accident.-It is not
io instrnet o!l unavoidable arcident in an automobile
notwithstanding dPfendants fnil to introduce
evwenee that the collision was cau;.;ed by something that
defendant driver eould not ha1·e an1ided hy exercise of reason;lble enre, sinee defl•wlauts han no burdPn of defending a
nf JWgligcuee with aftlrmatin; proof of an unavoidable
ne~id<"nL

Negligence-Instructions--Unavoidable Accident.- -ThP giving
of :111 instnwtion on unavoi<lahlc nceident is not rendered
improper by any tl•JH1Pm'y it might have to divert jurors from
the d('Ei,.,in is sur$, or to permit defPndants to escape liability
for sonw renson other ih:m their freedom from negligence or
plaintiff's contributory negligenc<', sinee a determination that
nn aecidPnt was unavoidable is propPr not only under evidencP
that it was caused by ris major, but whPre evidenee shows
plaintiff has failed in his proof.
l8] Automobiles-- Appeal- Harmless Error- Instructions.-Jnstrueting· in an automobile collision case on unavoidable
Hccident at defPndant's Tl'(/tH~st cannot he said to be harmful
1o plaintiff, since plaintiff, in any event, has the burden of
proving- the collision wns ocensiorwd sol(•ly hy defendant's
IH'gligenee.
j9j !d.-Instructions-Unavoidable Accident.---Tn an automobile
intersection collision case, dPfendants arc 1mtitled to an in~truction on unavoidahk ;wcidrnt, where no rlaim is madP
that rltd'end11nt driYrr IHt~ twgligent as a mattrr of Jaw, and
wlwre the evidenrP is sueh as to rPquire the jury to decide
which, if rither, drivPr fniled to use due carp in entering
the intersection.
1101 New Trial-Errors Relating to Instructions-DiscretionReview.----GPnernll.l· thP dPtennination as to whether an erronpous instrurtion was prejucli<·ial and ;justiflrs granting of
a new trial is left to the trial court's discretion, and where a
motion is granted upon that ground, the order will not be
disturbed unless it appears that there has herm an abuse of
that diseretion: hut when no error has been committed, there
no hasis for the pxereisr of diseretion.
Id.-Errors Relating to Instructions-Absence of Error.~
\Vhere a new trial has be<'n granted beeause of a correct in~trurtion whi0h thr !'onrt Rhonld havP g-ivPn, and did givr,
Sre 20 Oal.Jur. 139;

;)!)

Am.Jur. 127.
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there is no basis for exPreise of
matter
of law there is no lPgal ground upon which a new trial nwy
be ordered. (Code Civ. Proc., ~ G:i7(7).)

APPEAL from an on1rr of the
Angelrs County ~Tanting a nrw trinL
Heversrd.

Conrt of IJOR
lt'red Miller, ,J ndge.

Action for dnmages for
suffered ht nn
eollision. Order granting plnintiff a new trial, reversrrl.
Ball, Hunt & Hart and Clarence S. Ilnnt for
Delmar vY. Doddriuge for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.--Loretta May Parker is suing for damages
assertedly caused by the negligent operation of an automobile
driven by Carl ·womack. At the request of vVomack, the jury
vvas instructed that no recovrry could be had if the accident
were an unavoidable one. After the entry of judgment for
Womack, a new trial was granted upon the ground that the
instruction was prejudicially erroneous. The only question
presented upou the appeal from that order concerns the
propriety of the instruction.
Mrs. Parker alleged that she was driving her automobile in
a northerly direction along l<Jarl Avenue when it collided with
one owned by Hoy Womack and being driven in a negligent
manner, vvesterly along 25th Street, by Carl ·womack. The
answer denied all negligence and pleaded that Mrs. Parker
had been guilty of contributory negligence.
Each of the streets is 36 feet wide, with no marked center
line. There were no traffic signs at the intersection. A honsP.
trees, and other objects on the southeast corner obstructed thP
view of one traveling from rast to west and also that of a
northbound driver.
1\frs. Parker was familiar with the intersection. Tn describing it, she testified that a driver traveling north on Earl A V0nne could not see traffic on 25th Street which was approaching
from the east until the front of his automobile wns approximately one foot north of the south curb line.
According to Mrs. Parker, in approaching 25th Street,
when 5 or 6 feet from the intersection she decreased the speed
of her car to less than 12 miles per hour and shifted into first
gear. She looked to the west and, when her car was a foot or
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into the• intersrction, lool;;ed to the east. She saw a westhound car approximatPly 75 or 100 feet from Earl A venue,
but formed no opinion as to its speed. She proceeded into the
interseetion at approximately the same speed, and did not
observe this vehiele until it was direetly in front of her
aud about one foot away.
Hoy Womack owned the westbound car, which was being
drivel! with his consent by Carl ·womack. Five other young
wer<> in it. Carl testified that he had stopped his car at
American A venue, one block east of Earl A venue. As he
related the details concerning his operation of the automobile,
after crossing American A venue, he increased the speed to
approximately 30 miles per hour, reducing it to 20 miles
per honr as he reached the intersection where the accident
()~<:urred.

Continuing his testimony, Carl said that, although his view
to the south on Earl Avenue was obstructed, at a point 100
feet east of the intersection he believed he could see traffic
within 20 or 30 feet of 25th Street. When 50 feet or less from
the intersection, he looked to the south, but saw no automobiles.
As he entered the intersection, he looked to the north. He
then turnPd to look to the south, and saw the Parker automobile "a couple of seconds" before the collision. At this time,
tlw front of his automobile was more than 6 feet into the intersection and the Parker ear >vas 6 or 7 feet south of the center
of 26th Street. He did not apply the brakes.
'rhe impact occurred in the northeast quadrant of the intersection, approximately 16 feet south of the north curb line of
25th Strert and 10% feet west of the east curb line of Earl
Avenue. A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence regarding the damage to the vehicles is that the Parker
automobile struck the side of the onr driven b~· vYornack at
approximately its center.
Passengers in the Womack automobile testified that they
were traveling approximately 20 miles per hour when entering
the intersection. One of them estimated that when she first
saw the Parker automobile, it was traveling at a speed of 20
miles per hour. Both vehicles, the witness ~aid, were then in
the intersection and an equal distance from the center of it.
Upon this evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the vVomacks. Mrs. Parker then moved for a new trial upon
Hine grounds. However, her points and authorities in support
of the motion, and the argument at the hearing of it, were
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limited to the sole point that the court erred in instructing the
jury as follows: ''In law v:e
what is termed an 11ll·
avoidable or inevitable accident. These terms do not mean
literally that it was not possible for such an accident to be
avoided. 'l'hey simply denote an accident that occurred without having been proximately caused by negligence. Even if
such an accident could have been avoided by the exercise of
<:xeeptional foresight, skill or caution, still, no one may be held
I iable for injuries resulting from it.''
'fhe minute order which records the action of the court in
granting the motion does not specify the ground upon which
it was made. However, unquestionably the new trial was
Mdcred because the trial judge concluded that he had erred in
iustructing the jury regarding the rule of unavoidable
aeeideut.
lT pon the appeal from that order, the vVomacks contend that,
as the issue of unavoidable accident is present in every case in
which the defendant is not guilty as a matter of law, the challPuged instruction was proper. Mrs. Parker argues that there
is no evidence justifying the giving of the instruction because
all of the testimony shows the happening of an accident which
would not have occurred except for the negligence of one or
both of the drivers.
[1] The terms inevitable or unavoidable accident signify
an injury which is caused by something other than the actionable negligence of the parties involved. 'l'he terms thus include
one caused by vis major, ·which usually is defined as a greater or
superior force, or an irresistible force. ''A loss by vis major is
one that results immediately from a natural cause without the
intervention of man, and could not have been prevented by
the exercise of prudence, diligence and care.'' (Black's Law
Dictionary.)
[2] An accident which is caused by an absence of exceptl:onal foresight, skill or care which the law does not expect of
the ordinarily prudent man is also characterized as inevitable
or unavoidable. No redress is afforded for an injury caused
by such an accident and the loss must be borne by the one upon
vi' hom it falls.
(38 Am.Jur. § 6, pp. 648, 649; 65 C.J.S. § 21,
pp. 429-434; 1 Shearman & Redfield on ~egligence [rev.ed.
1941], § 32, pp. 86-90.) [3] Otherwise stated, and incorporating both factors which relieve one from liability, an accident is inevitable or unavoidable when it is not proximately
eaused by negligence. As recently defined by this conrt,
''. . . the so-called defense of inevitable accident is nothing
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defendant of
or a contention
was not the proximate cause of
Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519.
[4] It need not be specially
a
denial of negligence. (Polk
supra, at p. 542; Martindale v. Atchi89 Cal.App.2d 400 [201 P.2c1
; 8iev47
225 [ 117 P.2d 717] ; 8chub:n Cal.App.2d 312
P.2d
; 8itlu;i v.
25 Cal.A pp.2d 294, 298 !77 P.2d :111] ;
!'rarer\'. Rlbe, 98 Cai.App. 101, 105 [27G P. 389].)
Ppon a rPcrird which includes affirmatiw evidew·p
prove an ac(•ident proximately caused by eircumthe control of an ordinarily prndPnt per:-:on, an
npon unavoidable accident has been held proper.
of such situations are an unforeseen failure of
brakes (Merry v. Knnclsen Creamery Co., 94 Cal.App.2d 7]5
l P.2d 905] ; Alward v. Paola, 79 Cal.App.2d 1 [179 P.2d
j l :the foot of an automobile driver becoming caught. between
the brake and clnteh pedals (Zafcris v. Bradlrcy, 28 Cal.App.2d
l R8
P .2d 70]) ; the sudden appearance of a horse 11pon the
(Jolley v. Clemens, 28 Cal.App.2d 55 [82 P.2d 51!);
and a child darting into the street (Creamer v. Cerrato, 1
CaL\pp.2d 441 [36 P.2d 1094]; Graham v. Consolidated
J!. T.
112 Cal.App. 6·18 [297 P. 617)).
But the application of the rule allowing the defensr of
lll1a,·oidable accident has not been limited to cases where the
defendant relies upon evidence of a proximate cause beyond
his eontrol. An instruction stating the law regarding thr- rigllt
of a def~>ndant from exemption from liability because thr
:w,·idPnt could not have been avoided has also been approved
1\·lwrc there was no eYidence that it was caused by any factor
,>J her than the Jack of eare. ''The dominating consid(•ration
in dealing 1Yith the 11·hole subject of inevitable accident, . . .
llw elelllentary requirement that before a plaintiff can recover he nmst make ont. his ease by the preponderance of all
evidenc8 before the' eourt or jury regardless of the stagr of
the m1se at wlli('.h it may have appeared or the particular
wl10 introllw···d it. 'l'o do this in a negligence ease he
ill!lst show I hat tlH· dr~feJ1dant was negligent and tlw negli!!'•'11('(' W<lR tlw proximate ea11se of the injnry eomp]ailte(l of.
But if the rteciclent was ine1'itable or 11navoidable that 1·s the
same thing as to say that the defendant was not negligent, or

]22

PARKER

v.

WmrACK

C.2d

that his negligence, if any, did not cause the acddent. In
other words, 1·t is to say that the plaintiff has faUecl ·in his
proof." (Jolley v. Clemens, 28 Cal.App.2d 55, 72, 73
P.2d 51] ; cited with approval in Polk v. City of Los Angeles,
snpra, at p. 543.)
[6] lVIrs. Parker asserts that the challenged instrnetion
should not have been given because no evidence of any kind
was offered by Womack tending to prove that sometl1ing happened to cause the collision which he could not have avoided
by the exercise of reasonable care. The argument erroneously
assumes that the law imposed upon him the burden of defending a charge of negligeuce with affirmative proof of an unavoidable accident. The contrary is true. (Polk Y. Ct'ty of
Los Angeles, supra, at p. 542.)
[7] It is also suggested that wlwre the evidence is such as
that shown by the record in this case, an instruction upon the
doctrine of unavoidable accident is improper because it may
tend to divert the minds of the jurors from thr decisive issues
of the case; the defendant may escape liability beeansc of
f:ome reason other than his freedom from negligence or the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The contention might
have some merit if the term "unavoidable accident" were
limited to include only one caused by vis ma,jor. But a
determination that au accident was unavoidable is also proper
where the evidence merely shows " . . . that the plaintiff haR
failed in his proof." ( J alley v. Clemens, supra, at p. 73.)
[8] -where an instruction defining such an accident is given
at the request of the defendant, it cannot be said to have been
harmful to the plaintiff "who in any event had the burden of
proving that the collision was occasioned solely by the negligence of the . . . [defendant] which, of course, would exelude unavoidable accident." (Pearce v. Elbe, supra, at p.
106.)
In Hyman v. Market Street Ry. Co .. 41 Cal. App.2d 647
1107 P.2d 485], and Scanclalis v . .Jenney, 132 Cal.App. 307
[22 P.2d 545], it was lwld that the giving of an instruction
concerning the rule of unavoidable accident ·was prejudicially
rrroneous. However, in each of these cases, the evidence
established the negligence of the defendant as a matter of
law. Under the evidence there was no question of negligence
for the jury to decide. [9] Here no claim is made that
'Womack was negligent as a matter of law. Upon the evidence
it was the duty of the jury to decide which, if either, of the
drivers failed to use due case in entering the intersection
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vVomacks were entitled to have the jury instructed
to the rule of unavoidable accident.
(10] As a general proposition, the determination as to
an erroneous instruction was prejudicial and justifies
of a new trial is one which is left to the trial
discretion, and where a motion is granted upon that
the order will not be disturbed unless it appears that
there has been an abuse of that discretion. However, when
JJO error has been committed, there is no basis for the exercise
discretion. The statutory ground for granting a new
bet·ause of the charge to the jury is that there has
been au " . . . error in law, occurring at the trial. . . . "
Code Civ. Proe., § 657, suhd. 7.) [11] It follows that
as in the present case, a new trial has been granted
becaUS(' of a correct instruction which the court should have
and was given, there is no basis for the exercise of
dis..:rd,ion. Under such circumstances, as a matter of law,
there is no legal ground upon which a new trial may be
ordered. (irioran v. Abbey, 63 Cal. 56.)
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. ,J., 'l'raynor, J.,

Schauer, J., and Spence, .J.,

.~oneurred.

CAR'rEii, J.-1 dissent. 'l'he instruction on unavoidable
accident should not have been given and the order granting a
new trial should be affirmed on that ground.
The majority opinion states that, with relation to the evidence introduced in this case, an instruction on unavoidable
accident is not improper because "the defense of unavoidable
aecideut has not been limited to cases where the defendant
relies upon evidence of a proximate cause beyond his control";
that "an accident is inevitable or unavoidable when it is not
proximately eaused by negligence.'' This argument proves
too much. If an instruction on unavoidable accident does not
add anything to instructions covering negligence, proximate
eause, and the burden of proving those matters, there is no
reason to g-ive such an instruction (as pointed out in Barr v.
HaU, 12 CaLApp.2d 489, at 492 [55 P.2d 1246] ), and that
iHstruction is improper at least where, as here, the jury is not
clearly advised that the subjects covered by the other specific
instructions are being repeated in a general and abstract
manner. rl'he definition included in the questioned instruction

]24
--~that

the terms unavoidable
inevitable
been
denote an accident that occurred without
caused by
''-ah;o shows that the
is not appropriate to this case. All the evidence here tends to
establish that the collision was
caused
negligence of one or both of the drivers. The effect of the instruction is to
into the case a third element not
the
of
and
negligence.
In Polk v. City
Los
26 CaL2d 519 [159 P.2d
!J31j, and Jolley,..
28 Cal.App.2d 55
P.2d 51],
the drfendants qnestioned the propriety of instructions stating
that the burden of proving that an accident was unavoidable
r<>sted npon the defendants and the statements in those cases
eoueerning unavoidable accident were addressed to that question. Moreover, the statement that a finding of unavoidable
accident merely means that the plaintiff has failed to prove
his ease, further illustrates that an instruction on that matter
is wholly unnecessary and is confusing in cases such as the
present one.
Hyman v. Market Street Ry. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 647 [107
P .2d 485], is an analogous case in that the evidence therein
indicated that negligence of one (or perhaps both) of the
defendants proximately caused the accident. There the
plaintiff, while a passenger on a streetcar owned and operated by one defendant, was injured by a collision with another
str-eetear owned and operated by the other defendant. It
was held that the giving of an instruction on unavoidable
aeeident was prejudieial error since there was no evidence of
unavoidability. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish
this case on the gTound that "the evidence established the
negligence of the defendant as a matter of law." But it is
apparent from the following statement of the facts that both
defendants were not negligent as a matter of law: "The
motorman of each car testified that his car was at a complete
stop when the other ear ran into it. Passengers on each ear
eorroborated the story of the motorman of their car." ( 41
Cal.App.2d at p. 648.) Had the doctrine announced in the
majority opinion been adopted, it would have been held that
the jury could have found that either of the defendants was
free from fault and that therefore the accident was unavoidable as to such defendant.
In any event, we are not here concerned with whether or not
the giving of the instruction would have required a reversal of

the collision was

una:void~

;

v.

; Martindale v.
"'"hHJ.UU

400 {201.
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''In the following cases the instruction was held proper
where there was evidence that the accident was unavoidable.
(Oraham v. Consolidated M. T. Co., 112 CaLApp. 648 [297
P. 617] (child ran into street) ; Creamer
Cerrato, 1 Cal.
App.2d 441 [36 P.2d 1094] (same); Jolley v. Clernens, 28 Cal.
App.2d 55 [82 P.2d 51] (horse suddenly appeared on highway); Zaferis v. Bradley, 28 Cal.App.2d 188
P.2d 70]
(driYer's foot beeame wedged between pedals); Smith v.
Harger, 84 CaLApp.2d 361 [191 P.2d 25] (small boy pushingon baek of dump truck); Jlerr-y v. Knudsen C1·eamer-y Co ..
94 Cal.App.2d 715 r211 P.2d 905] (brake failure)
"In Jacques v. Sotdhcr-n Pac. Co., 8 Cal.App.2d 738 [4R
P.2d 63], Barr v.lfall, 12 Cal.App.2d 489, 492 [55 P.2d 12461,
and D'Avanzo v. Manno, 16 Cal.App.2d 346 [60 P.2d 524],
it was held proper to refuse the instruction where there was no
evidence that would have supported a finding of nnavoidablP
accident. In Jacques v. Southern Pac. Co., snpra, the court
said (p. 741): 'There was no evidence upon which this
instruction could be based. All the evidcnce tended to support
the respective theories of the two parties-one, that tlJC accident was due to the careless and negligent operat.ion of tJw
train, the other, that it was due to respondent's negligence
in running in front of the moving train. The evidence all
tended to prove the respective theories-that the accident
was not unavoidable but that it could have been avoided by
the other party.' This statement fits our case precisely ..
"In the present case, the instruction not only tended to
divert the minds of the jurors from the decisive issues of
negligence and contributory negligence, but suggested that
under the evidence the defendants might be held blameless
for some reason other than their freedom from negligenee or
contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. In view of
the evidence we have stated we can conceive of no theory
mH1er which the accident could have been found to be
mwvoidable, unless it be that collisions at intersections, where
the Yiews of thr driyers are obstructed, are bound to occur,
and therefore may be deemed unavoidable. 'l'his would be a
highly unrcasonable theory, but appellants have suggested
no better one. They say: 'From the evidence adduced, the
jury could have found that defendant Womack exercised
reasonable eare in the eontrol of his automobile,' and also,
'accepting plaintiff's version, it might well be, that a jury
could conelude her conduct was not negligent.' Without
comment on these statements, we add that the jury could not
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have found both parties to lmve been free from
Appellants' analysis of the evidence and their
""'"·"'"' tend to emphasize the fact that the accident was
not una voidable.
'\\Thl're a new trial is granted for the reason that an
,·noneow; instruetion ·was prejudicial to the rights of the
, the order will not be reversed unless it can be
that the ruling was an abuse of discretion. (Nance v.
Vines, Inc., 44 Cal.App.2d 868 [113 P.2d 244];
v. California St. Cable Ry. Co., 73 Cal.App.2d 641
: 167 P.2d 2:39]; Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 25 Cal.2d
165
P.2d~338l; Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation,
2::5 Cal.2d 256 [143 P.2d 929] ; Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal.App.2d
4:58 [207 P.2d 876!; Jones v. Scurlock, 96 Cal.App.2d 201
!214 P.2d 599j.
'l'he order granting a new trial was not an
abuse of discretion, but, upon the contrary, was a proper one
fo1· the court to make.''
For tlH' reasolls stated I would aft1rm the order granting a
nl'w trial.
Nhenk, ,J., concurred.

(Sac. No. 0162.
OEOHUI•~

In Bank.

:May S, 1951.]

E. J;'OO'I'E, Petitioner, v. 'l'HE S'l'A'l'B BAR OP
GA l.;lFORN IA, Hespondent.

Ill Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Acts Involving Moral
Turpitude.--In proceedings for the suspension of an attorney,
his opinion as to the probable outcome of a will contest which
he was engaged to proseeute is immaterial, and does not justify
his unauthorized stipulation dismissiug the contest and subsequent misrepresentations to his clients as to the pendency
of the hearing thereon.
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Acts Justifying Suspension.The suspension of an attorney for nine months is warranted
by the moral turpitude demonstrated by his unauthorized dismissal of a will contest and subsequent misrepresentation as
to the pendency of the hearing until after the opportunity to
eontest the will has passed, although his clients may have
suffered no loss through his misconduct.

11] See 3 Cal.Jur. 731; 9 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.) 493.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 141; [2] Attorneys,
149( 4).

